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RESUMEN 
Proponemos una econom￿a tipo Tiebout con dos regiones, tales que: i) en 
cada regi￿n la pol￿tica redistributiva se elige por votaci￿n mayoritaria, y ii) 
el salario de equilibrio de cada regi￿n se determina de manera end￿gena a 
travØs del mercado de trabajo de cada regi￿n. Suponemos que la habilidad 
de los ciudadanos de estas regiones se distribuye de manera ex￿gena, y 
estudiamos quØ condiciones debe cumplir la distribuci￿n de habilidad para 
garantizar que, dada la elecci￿n de pol￿tica redistributiva de cada regi￿n, 
ningœn ciudadano tenga incentivo a emigrar a otra regi￿n. Encontramos dos 
condiciones suficientes: 1) que la regi￿n con menor habilidad media tenga 
un ciudadano mediano cuya habilidad sea inferior a la habilidad media de 
dicha regi￿n, 2) que la regi￿n con mayor habilidad media tenga un 
ciudadano mediano cuya habilidad sea superior a la habilidad media de 
dicha regi￿n.   
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We study to what extend in a Tiebout economy, the exogenous distribution 
of skill across agents affects the compatibility between mobility an 
redistribution. We propose a two-region economy where: i) each region 
redistributive policy is elected by majority rule (where both cases: myopic 
and sophisticated voters are considered), and ii) each region wage is 
endogenously determined by a separated labor market. We find that the 
compatibility between mobility and redistribution can be guaranteed when 
either there is a low-skilled region where the median skilled agent is below 
the mean skill of the region, or/and when there is a high-skilled region 
where the median skilled agent is above the mean skill of the region.  
Keywords:  Tiebout Economy; Redistribution; Sophisticated Voting; 
Majority rule. 
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 1 Introduction
The globalization process as well as the development of economic unions
h a si m p r o v e dt h em o b i l i t yo fw o r k e r sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent regions or states, it
is for instance the case of some federal states as United States, Canada or
G e r m a n y . L a b o rm a r k e tt r e n d sa sw e l la sw e l f a r ep o l i c i e sa r et w ob a s i c
determinants of the in- and out-ﬂows of citizens across neighboring regions
or countries. Depending on the individual characteristics, the residential
decisions are motivated by diﬀerent incentives. Thus, whereas high-skilled (or
highly-educated) individuals are more interested in higher wages and lower
taxation rates, low-skilled (or low-educated) individuals are more interested
in large welfare programs ﬁnanced by substantial income taxation.
While citizens take the residential decisions, the composition of the elec-
torate is aﬀected by the migration ﬂo w sw h i c ha tt h es a m et i m ea l t e rp o l i c y
decisions. Thus, in-ﬂows of high skilled individuals shall alter the political
decision by reducing income taxations, and in-ﬂows of low skilled individuals
shall modify the political decisions towards larger welfare programs.
In this paper, we investigate the labor markets forces as a basic deter-
minant of location and, via composition of the electorate, its inﬂuence on
the redistributive policies. The paper draws on previous contributions that
are based on the novel paper of Tiebout [12]. See for instance Westhoﬀ [13],
Epple et al. [2] where location is determined by the elected provision of local
public good, and see also the more related contributions of Epple and Romer
[3] and Hansen and Kessler [6] where location is also based on the elected
redistributive policy as well as on the housing market prices.
We present a two-region economy with a continuum of individuals that
diﬀer in their skill level. In each region there is a labor market. The in-ﬂows
of individuals increase labor supply, and as a consequence wages decrease.
On the contrary, the out-ﬂows of individuals increase wages. Each region
redistributive policy is decided by majority voting among the residents of
the region.1 Thus, the individuals take two decisions: what region they
joint, and what taxation policy they vote for.
In a previous paper, Puy [10], we characterize the set of redistributive
policies that guarantee that mobility and redistribution are compatible. As a
counterbalance eﬀect, regions with higher wages require higher redistribution,
1As Konishi [8] claims:“Majority voting is one of the most plausible candidates to
describe a jurisdiction’s decision mechanism in the actual economy”.
2and regions with lower wages require lower redistribution .
Epple and Romer [3] and Hansen and Kessler [6] also analyze the inter-
action between mobility and redistribution. Their models assume an exoge-
nous distribution of income across agents. Whereas these authors analyze
the housing market eﬀect, we analyze the labor market eﬀect. Note that
either if we consider a housing market or a labor market, migration induces
an equivalent implicit cost since the in-ﬂows of individuals aﬀects negatively
the residents’ income (increasing housing prices or decreasing wages). Epple
and Romer [3] provide an example to illustrate equilibrium existence but
they also ﬁnd non-existence examples, i.e., examples where the elected level
of redistribution is not compatible with the residential decision. Hansen and
Kessler [6] shows equilibrium existence under the assumption of a unimodal
distribution of income where the median income of the overall population is
lower than the mean.2
From the above mentioned contributions, we ﬁnd that the shape of the
exogenous distribution of either income or skill may be crucial to guarantee
existence of equilibrium in those economies where the redistributive policies
are elected by majority rule. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to
study what type of skill distributions guarantee that the redistributive poli-
cies elected by majority rule are compatible with the residential decisions.
When analyzing the political decisions, we consider two diﬀerent types of
voting behavior: myopic voters and sophisticated voters. When voters are
myopic, they take the population of their region as ﬁxed and they just vote
for his most preferred policy. Following Epple and Romer [3], when voters are
sophisticated, they anticipate the migration ﬂows induced by the tax rates.
For both types of voting behavior and for any given distribution of skill,
we show that the redistributive taxation elected by majority voting is not al-
ways compatible with the residential decision.3 We also ﬁnd two types of skill
distributions that guarantee such compatibility: i) distributions which induce
a low-skilled region where the median skilled agent is below the mean skill
of that region, and ii) distributions which induce a high-skilled region where
the median skilled agent is above the mean skill of that region. Therefore,
there is only a type of distribution such that mobility and redistribution are
not compatible. Such distribution is characterized by inducing a low-skilled
2Where, as we mention in the conclusions, the assumption on land restriction is crucial
to guarantee existence of equilibrium.
3See also Epple and Romer [3] footnote 18 for non-existence examples.
3region where the median skill is higher than the mean skill, and a high-skilled
region where the median skill is lower than the mean skill.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and classiﬁes the diﬀerent types of skill distributions. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the case of myopic voters. Section 4 studies the case of sophisticated
voters. Finally Section 5 provides the conclusions.
2 The Model
We consider an economy that consists of a continuum of agents in the set
N =[ 0 ,1], denoted by i ∈ [0,1] who are free to migrate among two regions.
Each region is indexed by a number k ∈ {1,2} and Nk is the set of agents
living in region k.
The regions:
We assume that each region has a competitive labor market that deter-
mines the equilibrium price of labor wk. Each region’ technology is described
by a function Tk : R+ → R+ that uses homogenous labor Lk as input. We




k(Lk)=∞. Labor demand in each region is determined
by the marginal productivity of labor, and labor supply is perfectly inelastic.
Consequently, the equilibrium price of labor wk is given by wk = T0
k (Lk). We
assume that the beneﬁts of production are not taxed and are shared among
a small group of agents who may or may not live in that region.
In each region there is a proportional income tax tk ∈ [0,1], which is cho-
sen by majority voting within each region. The vector t =( t1,t 2) describes
the proportional income tax rates for the two regions. This taxation ﬁnances
a uniform transfer among the agents in Nk.
The agents:
Agents diﬀer in their skill. Each agent i is endowed with λi units of
eﬃcient homogenous labor that are entirely devoted to labor, so that each
region’ labor supply Lk is the sum of λi across the agents in Nk.T h eλi ´ sa r e
distributed according to a continuous and strictly positive density function
f on λ with range [λ0,1] where λ0 ∈ (0,1).
Agent i´s labor earnings4 are given by wkλi(1−tk). Since the tax revenues
4There is evidence showing that there is a close relation between the level of education
4match the expenditure for per capita transfer, the uniform transfer is given
by wk¯ λktk where ¯ λk is the mean skill in region k.
Thus, for a given tax rate tk and labor price wk, agent i´s net income if
he chooses to live in region k, is
Yk (λi,t k)=wkλi (1 − tk)+tk ¯ wk (1)
where ¯ wk = ¯ λkwk are mean labor earnings (or mean wage) in region k.
Migration is costless. Agent i migrates from region k to region   if by so
doing, he strictly increases his net income, i.e., if Yk (λi,t k) <Y   (λi,t  ). We
assume that when an agent decides to migrate, he takes the other region’
wage as ﬁxed.
The description of an economy that satisﬁes all the assumptions listed
above is denoted by E = {T,f}, where T = {T1,T 2} describes the technolo-
gies of the two regions.
The External Equilibrium
Let P = {N1,N 2} be a partition of the population. Following Epple et
al. [2] and Epple and Romer [3], an external equilibrium for the economy
E is a pair {t,P} such that given t, the partition P satisﬁes that:
i) all regions are inhabited, i.e., for every k ∈ {1,2},N k 6= ∅,
ii) no agent wants to migrate, i.e., for every k,  ∈ {1,2} and every i ∈ Nk,
Yk (λi,t k) > Y  (λi,t  ).
Regions can be ordered according to the skill level so that ¯ λ1 < ¯ λ2 where
¯ λk is the mean skill of region k. As we shall show, the following properties of
P are required to guarantee existence of an external equilibrium.
Stratiﬁcation (S): both regions are inhabited and the population of each
region belongs to a single interval of skill.
Boundary Indiﬀerence (BI): between the two regions, there is a boundary
indiﬀerent agent with skill ˆ λ such that Y1(ˆ λ,t1)=Y2(ˆ λ,t2).
Increasing Net Labor Prices (INLP): w1 (1 − t1) 6 w2(1 − t2).
A partition which satisﬁes the above properties is such that all the agents




live in region 1 and all the agents with
attainment and the employment income. For instance, in 1999, relative earnings in USA
for individuals with education below upper secondary is 67, whereas that of individuals
with tertiary education is 173. Source:O E C D .




, live in region 2. And by INLP, the net
price of labor is higher in the region where the agents have higher skill.
We say that the regions are identical when w1 (1 − t1)=w2(1−t2) and
¯ w1t1 =¯ w2t2. Note that when the regions are identical, every agent obtains
equal net income in both regions. The external equilibrium where the two
regions are identical are trivial equilibria, we therefore shall focus on external
equilibria deﬁned as follows. A non-trivial external equilibrium for the
economy E is an external equilibrium {t,P} when either:
a) the regions are not identical, or
b) the regions are identical but P satisﬁes S.
Some necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence of a non-trivial
external equilibrium are provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Puy [10])5 Let E be an economy. Then S, BI and INLP
are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for {t,P} to be a non-trivial external
equilibrium of E.
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0    wt 
  w (1-t ) 
Indifferent curve of agent λ 1 
 Indifferent curve of agent λ 2 
Figure 1: The non-trivial external equilibrium  
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Note that when the two regions are identical, S is not a necessary condi-
tion for an external equilibrium since the population is indiﬀerent living in
either one of the two identical regions. From INLP and BI it follows that
¯ w1t1 > ¯ w2t2. Thus, in every non-trivial external equilibrium, lower skilled
5While Epple and Romer [3] show that these are necessary conditions for an external
equilibrium, Puy [10] shows that the conditions are also suﬃcient.
6agents live in the region with higher transfer but lower net price of labor.
As we show in Figure 1, the sorting of the population across regions is then
derived from the single-crossing property of the preferences deﬁned on the
pairs (w(1 − t), ¯ wt).
The taxation schemes for which a non-trivial external equilibrium exists
can be characterized.
Proposition 2 (Puy [10]) For every E, a non-trivial external equilibrium
exists if and only if t1 > t2
λ0(1−t2)+t2.
The taxation schemes (t1,t 2) that satisfy the above inequality are repre-
sented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Taxation policies that guarantee existence of external equilibrium 
Hence, from Proposition 2 we deduce that the greater is the range of the
skill distribution [λ0,1], i.e., as λ0 → 0, the smaller is the set of tax rates
for which no agent wishes to migrate. Note that every external equilibrium
requires that t1 > t2, where the only two cases such that it holds with equality
are t1 = t2 =0and t1 = t2 =1 . In these two cases however, it is easy to
show that both regions are identical.
The Internal Equilibrium
The internal equilibrium requires that in each region, the taxation policy
be elected by majority voting. For the economy E,an internal equilibrium
7is a pair {t,P} such that given P, each tk is the result of majority voting in
region k.
In our integrated approach, for each economy E,a political equilibrium
is given by a pair {t,P} that is simultaneously an internal equilibrium and
a non-trivial external equilibrium.
Whether or not a political equilibrium exists for every possible economy
E, is the question that we pose in this paper. We distinguish among diﬀerent
economies by means of classifying the skill distributions.
By S and BI,in a stratiﬁed partition, regions can be ordered according
to skill levels. Let λ
m
k denote the skill of the median agent in region k.
Depending on the shape of f and on ˆ λ,i ne a c hr e g i o ne i t h e rλ
m
k > ¯ λk or
λ
m
k < ¯ λk. Thus, the relation between the median and the mean skilled agents
in each region determines the following properties of the skill distributions.
The distribution f is low-median (LM) in region k if every stratiﬁed
partition is such that λ
m
k 6 ¯ λk.6 The distribution f is high-median (HM)
in region k if every stratiﬁed partition is such that λ
m
k > ¯ λk.
Since there are two regions, a distribution can be either LM or HM in
region 1 and LM or HM in region 2. Notation such as LM-HM, indicates a
LM distribution in region 1, and a HM distribution in region 2. Thus, we
can deﬁne up to four diﬀerent types of skill distributions: LM-HM, LM-LM,
HM-HM and HM-LM.
A LM-LM distribution can be generated by density functions which are
decreasing in λ. In a similar way, HM-HM distributions can be generated
by density functions which are increasing in λ. T h e r ei sn od i s t r i b u t i o nh o w -
ever, that qualiﬁes as LM-HM and HM-LM since as the skill of the indiﬀerent
agent ˆ λ approaches the two extremes of the range [λ0,1], region 1 and region
2 should display an equivalent relation between the mean and the median
skilled agent. For instance, if the overall distribution is such that the me-
dian skill is below the mean skill (as the right-skewed distribution), when ˆ λ
approaches λ0 region 1 is LM and when ˆ λ approaches 1, region 2 is LM. To
overcome this problem, we propose to soften the proposed classiﬁcation by
means of analyzing the shape of f just for the stratiﬁed partition of equi-
librium (not for every stratiﬁed partition).7 This classiﬁcation is not fully
convincing since it depends on the equilibrium value ˆ λ, it however is a way
6Just to facility the analysis we include in this deﬁnition the case λ
m
k = ¯ λk.
7Section 4 provides a condition which guarantees that in equilibrium there is a unique
equilibrium value of ˆ λ.
8of classifying all the skill distributions in terms of the regions’ median skill.
In order to analyze the internal equilibrium, two diﬀerent kinds of vot-
ing rationality is considered: myopic voters and sophisticated voters. The
following two sections analyze each type of voting behavior.
3 The Case of Myopic Voters
When a myopic voter decides his most preferred tax rate, he takes the pop-
ulation of each region as given. As follows from (1), the net income function
of agent i is given by Yk (λi,t k)=wkλi + wktk
¡¯ λk − λi
¢
where wk and ¯ λk
are assumed to be ﬁxed. Agents with skill below the mean prefer tk =1 ,a n d
agents with skill above the mean prefer tk =0 .T h u s ,tk =1is elected when
the median skilled agent is below the mean skill of the region, and tk =0is
elected when the median skilled agent is above the mean skill of the region.
When the median and the mean skilled agents coincide, all t ∈ [0,1] can be
obtained as an internal equilibrium, we then take the convention of electing
tk =1 . The following lemma states, for each type of skill distribution, the
tax policies elected by majority voting.
Lemma 1 Let E = {T,f} be an economy where agents are myopic. Then
every internal equilibrium {t,P} is such that:
a) t =( 1 ,0) if f is LM-HM, c) t =( 0 ,0) if f is HM-HM,
b) t =( 1 ,1) if f is LM-LM, d) t =( 0 ,1) if f is HM-LM.
We next analyze whether or not a political equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1 Let E = {T,f} be an economy where voters are myopic. If f is
LM-HM, LM-LM or HM-HM, a political equilibrium exists. If f is HM-LM,
a political equilibrium always fails to exist.
Proof. When f satisﬁes LM-HM, LM-LM or HM-HM, by majority voting
taxation t =( 1 ,0), t =( 1 ,1) and t =( 0 ,0) are respectively elected. Following
Proposition 2, condition t1 > t2
λ0(1−t2)+t2 holds which guarantees that a non-
trivial external equilibrium {t,P} also exists. Thus, {t,P} is a political
equilibrium.
If f is HM-LM, by majority voting t =( 0 ,1). Since this taxation scheme does
not satisfy the condition of Proposition 2, a non-trivial external equilibrium
fails to exist.
9From Theorem 1 we ﬁnd that majority rule does not always lead to an
external equilibrium. In particular, if f is HM-LM, majority voting elects
t =( 0 ,1) which is not compatible with an external equilibrium. As we show
in Figure 3, the taxation scheme t =( 0 ,1) leads to a stratiﬁed partition such
that all the agents in region 1 improve moving to region 2 whereas all the
agents in region 2 improve moving to region 1.
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4 The Case of Sophisticated Voters
When voters are sophisticated, they take into account that the redistributive
policies generate migration ﬂows between the regions. These migrations de-
termine the labor supply of each region, which ﬁnally also determines each
region wage.
From S, BI and the continuity of f, we deduce that in a non-trivial exter-
nal equilibrium, each region’ labor supply and mean skill ¯ λk can be obtained
as a continuously diﬀerentiable function of the indiﬀerent agent ˆ λ.8 And since
wk (Lk)=T0
k (Lk) where Tk is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, the wages can
be also obtained as a continuously diﬀerentiable function of ˆ λ, wk(ˆ λ). Hence,
each agent’ net income, that is given by Yk(λi,t)=wk(ˆ λ)(1− tk)λi+¯ wk(ˆ λ)tk,
can be expressed as a continuously diﬀerentiable function of ˆ λ.
8Note that ∂¯ λ1
∂ˆ λ = ˆ λf(ˆ λ) and ∂¯ λ2
∂ˆ λ = −ˆ λf(ˆ λ), so that if f is continuous, the mean skill
is continuously diﬀerentiable.
10The sophisticated voters forecast t h em e m b e r s h i po fe a c hr e g i o n . F o r
that, voters should deduce for each possible t, the skill of the indiﬀerent agent
ˆ λ. As we show in the Appendix, the following assumption is suﬃcient (but
not necessary) to guarantee that for every non-trivial external equilibrium
{P,t}, the skill of the indiﬀerent agent ˆ λ is unique and can be obtained as a
continuously diﬀerentiable function of t so that ˆ λ = Φ(t).
Assumption 1: In every non-trivial external equilibrium
∂ ¯ w1(ˆ λ)
∂ˆ λ 6 0.
This assumption requires that the production function of region 1 be
suﬃciently concave so that movements in region 1’s population aﬀect wages
substantially.9 Solving for the derivative,









Thus, Assumption 1 implies that migration in-ﬂows to region 1 provoke a
greater eﬀect on wages than on the mean skill of region 1.10
In the Appendix we also show that under Assumption 1,
∂Φ(t)
∂t1 < 0 and
∂Φ(t)
∂t2 < 0. The former derivative implies that as t1 increases, the higher skilled
agents of region 1 (who are taxpayers in region 1) increase income moving
to region 2. The second derivative implies that as t2 increases, the higher
skilled agents of region 1 also increase income moving to region 2 where they
beneﬁt from the redistributive policy.
As a result, sophisticated voters can forecast migration ﬂows. Under
Assumption 1, their net income can be derived as a continuous function of t
so that, Yk (λi,t)=wk(Φ(t))λi (1 − tk)+¯ wk(Φ(t))tk. Thus, each agent most
preferred policy tk maximizes the agent’ net income.
We next check whether a Condorcet winner tax rate exists for each of the
regions. In particular, it can be shown that preferences satisfy the simplest
version of the condition labeled by Grandmont [5] as “intermediate prefer-
ences”. This condition guarantees that majority rule is transitive. Voters in
the set [λ0,1] have intermediate preferences since the net income function can
be rewritten as Yk (λi,t)=J(tk)λi +H(tk) where J(tk)=wk(Φ(t))(1 − tk),
9As we show in Puy [10], Assumption 1 can be rewritten in terms of elasticities. To
provide an example, for a uniform distribution, if T1 = Lα
1 then α 6 1
2 guarantees that
Assumption 1 holds.
10Hindriks [7] hypothesizes to the contrary, that poor agents want to attract rich agents
to increase mean income, his model however does not account for any implicit moving cost
as wage eﬀect or housing price eﬀect.
11H(tk)=¯ wk(Φ(t))tk,f (λi)=λi, where the terms J(tk),H(tk) are common
for all voters. As demonstrated by Persson and Tabellini [9] (p.26), when vot-
ers have preferences of this form, the policy preferred by the median voter
will emerge as a Condorcet winner from a majority voting process.
In the following lemma we state the tax policies chosen by majority rule.
T h ec a s ew h e r ef is HM-LM is studied later on. Note that it is important to
check that the elected tax policies generate a non-trivial external equilibrium
to guarantee that ˆ λ can be obtained as a continuously diﬀerentiable function
of t.
Lemma 2 Let E = {T,f} be an economy satisfying Assumption 1 and where
voters are sophisticated. Then, every internal equilibrium {t,P} is such that:
a) t =( 1 ,0) if f is LM-HM,
b) t1 =1 ,t 2 ∈ [0,1] if f is LM-LM,
c) t1 ∈ [0,1],t 2 =0if f is HM-HM.
Proof. As it is shown in the Appendix, provided that a non-trivial external
equilibrium exists, Assumption 1 guarantees that ˆ λ can be obtained as a
continuous function of t. Thus, the function Yk is also continuous in the




wk(Φ(t))λi (1 − tk)+¯ wk(Φ(t))tk (2)








dΦ tk)+¯ wk(Φ(t))—wk(Φ(t))λi. (3)
For each type of skill distribution f, we next calculate the median agent’
most preferred policy.
a) f is LM-HM. We ﬁrstly analyze region 1. Since
dw1(ˆ λ)
dˆ λ < 0, (¯ w1 − w1λi) >
0 and by Assumption 1
∂Φ(t)
∂t1 < 0,
d ¯ w1(ˆ λ)












and so, t1 =1is the majority
voting taxation.




dˆ λ > 0,
d ¯ w2(ˆ λ)
dˆ λ > 0 and
11We shall not consider restrictions of the kind λi 6 Φ(t) when λi ∈ N1,o rλi > Φ(t)
when λi ∈ N2 to guarantee that the internal equilibrium is feasible. We however, will
check these conditions when showing existence of the political equilibrium.
12(¯ w2 − w2λi) 6 0 for all λi ∈
£¯ λ2,1
¤
,w eh a v e
∂Y2(λi,t)






and then t2 =0is the majority voting taxation.
Since by Proposition 2, t =( 1 ,0) generates a non-trivial external equilibrium,
Φ is properly deﬁned so that t =( 1 ,0) is the result of majority voting.
b) f is LM-LM. By a), t1 =1 . Then, by Proposition 2, t =( 1 ,t 2) where
t2 ∈ [0,1] generates a non-trivial external equilibrium. It implies that Φ is
properly deﬁned and so, Y2 is a continuous function deﬁned over t2 ∈ [0,1].
Thus, by LM, λ
m
2 ∈ (ˆ λ, ¯ λ2) and so (¯ w2 − w2λ
m
2 ) > 0. Then, the taxation
policy t2 ∈ [0,1] that maximizes Y2 (λ
m
2 ,t) is a majority voting equilibrium
for region 2.
c) f is HM-HM. By a), t2 =0 . Then, by Proposition 2, t =( t1,0) where
t1 ∈ [0,1] generates a non-trivial external equilibrium. It implies that Φ is
properly deﬁned and so, Y1 is a continuous function deﬁned over t1 ∈ [0,1].
Thus, by HM, λ
m
1 ∈ (¯ λ1, ˆ λ) and then the taxation policy t1 ∈ [0,1] that
maximizes Y1 (λ
m
1 ,t) is a majority voting equilibrium for region 1.
Migration in-ﬂows increase labor supply provoking a reduction in wages.
Whereas voters of region 1 avoid migration in-ﬂows by means of increasing
t1, voters of region 2 avoid migration in-ﬂows reducing t2.
When region 1 is LM, the median voter beneﬁts from the redistributive
policy and, additionally, increasing the tax rate, wages become higher. Thus,
t =1is elected. When region 1 is HM, the median voter beneﬁts from no
redistribution at all, however, in order to obtain a higher wage he shall avoid
in-ﬂows from region 2 so that any t1 ∈ [0,1] can be elected.
When Region 2 is LM, the median voter beneﬁts from total redistribution,
h o w e v e r ,b ym e a n so fr e d u c i n gt h et a xr a t eh ea v o i d sm i g r a t i o ni n - ﬂows of
agents from region 1 so that any t2 ∈ [0,1] can be elected. When Region 2
is HM, the median voter is taxpayer so that he prefers t2 =0 , additionally,
t2 =0avoids migration in-ﬂows and it increases wages.
We next analyze the case where f is HM-LM.
Theorem 2 Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption 1 and where voters
are sophisticated. Then, if f is HM-LM, a political equilibrium might fail to
exist.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for every E a political equilibrium
exists. In particular it should exists for an economy where T2(L)=L1−ε with
ε>0 and close enough to 0.12 We next show that t =( t1,1) where t1 ∈ (0,1]
12Note that no restriction is imposed on T1 so that Assumption 1 holds.




for all t2 ∈ [0,1] so that t2 =1is the bliss point of the median agent in
region 2. From (3) and taking into account that T2(L)=L1−ε implies that
dw2(Φ(t))





































(¯ λ2 − λ
m
2 ) (4)
where I = w1(1−t1)−w2(1−t2) a n ds i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a ta ne x t e r n a l
equilibrium exists, by Proposition 1, INLP holds which implies that I<0.
By Assumption 1 we have
∂ ¯ w1(Φ(t))






(ˆ λ − ¯ λ2)K + w2
+
(¯ λ2 − λ
m
2 )
where K>0 is the fraction containing the remaining terms of equation
(4). Since the term
∂¯ λ2(Φ(t))
∂Φ w2t2 appears in (4) multiplying and dividing, we
deduce that K<1. Then, if we consider a density function f such that λ
m
2
is close enough to ˆ λ, we have
¯ ¯ ¯ˆ λ − ¯ λ2





∂t2 > 0 for
every t2 ∈ [0,1].
We next show that the majority voting taxation in region 1 is such that
t1 ∈ [0,1). In particular we show that
∂Y1(λm
1 ,t)
∂t1 |t1=1,t 2=1< 0 which implies













∂t1 and taking into account that
dw2(Φ(t))



















(¯ λ1 − λ
m
1 ) (5)
14The above derivative can be rewritten as
∂Y1(λm
1 ,t)
∂t1 |t1=1,t 2=1' −w1
−
(¯ λ1 − ˆ λ)K
0 + w1
−
(¯ λ1 − λ
m
1 )
where K0 > 0 is the fraction containing the remaining terms of equation (5).
Since the term
∂ ¯ w1(Φ(t))
∂Φ appears in (5) multiplying and dividing, we deduce
that K0 < 1. Then, if we consider a density function f such that λ
m
1 is close





∂t1 |t1=1,t 2=1< 0.W e
conclude that t =( t1,1) where t1 ∈ [0,1) is the majority voting taxation.
However, if we check the necessary condition for a non-trivial external equi-
librium stated in Proposition 2: t1 > t2
λ0(1−t2)+t2 we ﬁnd that a non-trivial ex-
ternal equilibrium fails to exist for the proposed economy, which contradicts
that a political equilibrium exists for every economy where f is HM-LM.
The basic point of this proof consists of providing an example where in
region 1 the median voter elects t1 ∈ [0,1) whereas in region 2 the median
voter elects t2 =1 , so that the elected tax policy is not compatible with an
external equilibrium (see Figure 2).
Finally, we aim at showing existence of political equilibrium for the other
types of skill distribution.
Theorem 3 Let E = {T,f} be an economy satisfying Assumption 1 and
where the agents are sophisticated. Then, if f is LM-HM, LM-LM, or HM-
HM, a political equilibrium exists.
Proof. If f is LM-HM,b yL e m m a2 ,t =( 1 ,0) is the majority voting
taxation and by Proposition 2, a non-trivial external equilibrium {t,P} also
exists where P is the stratiﬁed partition deﬁned by ˆ λ = Φ(t) where t =( 1 ,0).
If f is LM-LM, by Lemma 2, the majority voting taxation is given by
t =( 1 ,t 2) where t2 ∈ [0,1] and by Proposition 2, a non-trivial external
equilibrium also exists. Let us next show that the partition generated by t
is such that we also obtain that t is elected by the median voter.
By Assumption 1 and as we show in the Appendix, for each t there exists a
unique continuously diﬀerentiable function Φ such that ˆ λ = Φ(t) and since
t1 =1it can be rewritten as ˆ λ = Φ(t2).
Since the voters are sophisticated, for an agent living in region 2, his most
preferred tax rate is given by
t2 ∈ argmax
t2∈[0,1]
w2 (Φ(t2))λi (1 − t2)+¯ w2 (Φ(t2))t2. (6)
15And since Φ is continuously diﬀerentiable, T2 is twice continuously diﬀer-
entiable and f is continuous, as λi varies, the solution to problem (6) also
varies in a continuous way. Hence, we deﬁne a continuous function M,t h a t
indicates for each λi the tax rate t2 o b t a i n e da sas o l u t i o nt o( 6 ) ,s ot h a t
M (λi)=t2.
For each ˆ λ ∈ (λ0,1), we consider that the skill of the median agent in re-
gion 2 is given by m(ˆ λ)=λ
m
2 where by continuity of f,w eh a v et h a tm
is continuous. An internal equilibrium which is also a non-trivial external
equilibrium requires that there exists t∗






where Φ is also a continuous function. And since the composition of contin-
uous functions is continuous, we have that M is a continuous function and
since M :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], by Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem there is t∗
2 ∈ [0,1]









where ˆ λ = Φ(t∗
2) and the tax policy t =( 1 ,t ∗
2).
If f is HM-HM, by Lemma 2 the majority voting taxation is given by
t =( t1,0) where t1 ∈ [0,1] and by Proposition 2, it generates a non-trivial
external equilibrium. By Assumption 1, for each t there exists a unique con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable function Φ such that ˆ λ = Φ(t) and since t2 =0it
can be rewritten as ˆ λ = Φ(t1). Thus, the most preferred tax rate of an agent
living in region 1 is given by:
t1 ∈ argmax
t1∈[0,1]
w1 (Φ(t1))λi (1 − t1)+¯ w1 (Φ(t1))t1. (8)
And since Φ is continuously diﬀerentiable, T1 is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable and f is continuous, as λi varies, the solution to (8) also varies in a
continuous way. We can then deﬁne a continuous function M that indicates
for each λi t h es o l u t i o nt o( 8 ) ,s ot h a tM(λi)=t2. The skill of the median
agent is given by a function m where m(ˆ λ)=λ
m
2 and where m is continuous
by continuity of f. Then, an internal equilibrium which is also a non-trivial
external equilibrium requires that there exists t∗






where by Brower’s ﬁxed point theorem there is t∗
1 ∈ [0,1] such that (9) holds
and ˆ λ = Φ(t∗
1). It proves that a political equilibrium exists.
16When f is LM-HM the elected redistributive policies t =( 1 ,0) are com-
patible with the external equilibrium. When f is LM-LM or HM-HM, we
show, by a ﬁxed point argument, that there is a taxation scheme t for which
the resulting sorting of the population across regions is such that majority
rule also elects this taxation scheme t.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The paper analyzes two main issues: it compares the two types of voting
behavior: myopic and sophisticated voting, and it analyzes what type of skill
distributions guarantee that the redistributive policy decision is compatible
with the residential decision.
We ﬁr s t l ya s s u m et h a tv o t e r sa r em y o p i c .W h e nv o t i n g ,t h em y o p i cv o t e r s
just take into account the redistributive eﬀect. Thus, zero taxation is elected
when the median skilled agent is above the mean skill and otherwise complete
redistribution is elected. We secondly assume that voters are sophisticated
so that they do not only account for the redistributive eﬀect but they also
account for the wage eﬀect that consists on avoiding migration in-ﬂows in
order to keep higher wages. Whereas in the region with low-skilled agents
t h ew a g ee ﬀect requires keeping t1 suﬃciently high, in the region with high-
skilled agents it requires keeping t2 suﬃciently low. Note that the wage eﬀect
is equivalent to the housing price eﬀect (see Epple and Romer [3] and Hansen
and Kessler [6]) since by means of avoiding migration in-ﬂows the housing
prices becomes lower.
Whereas myopic voting leads to corner solutions (tk =0or tk =1 ) ,
sophisticated voting does not always lead to corner solutions. Concerning
equilibrium existence, we ﬁnd that both voting behaviors display similar re-
sults since we can guarantee existence of equilibrium for the same underlying
type of skill distributions.
We have proposed four types of skill distributions deﬁn e di nt e r m so f
the location of the median skilled agents with respect to the mean skilled
agents and we have studied what redistributive policy is elected by majority
voting in each of the regions. We ﬁnd that there are two features of the
skill distributions which make the redistributive policy decision compatible
with the residential decision: i) when the low-skilled region has a median
voter with skill below the mean (and so, t1 =1 ) , and ii) when the high-
skilled region has a median voter with skill above the mean (and so, t2 =0 ) .
17When the underlying skill distribution is such that one (or both) of these
properties hold, either myopic or sophisticated voting guarantees equilibrium
existence. Equilibrium existence problems may appear when none of the
above mentioned properties hold. In this case, the region with low skill
opts for low redistribution whereas the region with high skill opts for high
redistribution.
The obtained results can be directly applied to the model of mobility
and redistribution with land restrictions developed by Hansen and Kessler
[6]. These authors restrict attention to unimodal distributions (of income)
where the median of the overall population is lower than the mean. Due
to the assumption of land restriction, the region with lower taxation and
higher income (which they identify with a tax-heaven) is almost inhabited
which implies that the other region keeps a median voter below the mean.
The proposed distribution satisﬁe st h ep r o p e r t yt h a tw ec a l ll o w - m e d i a ni n
region 1 since the land restriction works as a quota which guarantees that
the median agent in region 1 is below the mean agent in region 1. Thus, the
proposed distribution of income guarantees existence of equilibrium.
As an extension we ﬁnd that it can be interesting to study the eﬀect
of migration in- and out-ﬂows on the relative position of the median and
the mean agent of some reasonable income distributions (as the log-normal
or the gamma distribution). Another extension is to analyze the eﬀect of
productivity improvements on the agents’ residential decision. Additionally,
alternative assumptions accounting for more realistic labor market struc-
tures, which for instance consider wage rigidities and unemployment, may
provide some greater insights into the compatibility between mobility and
redistribution.
18Appendix
The skill ˆ λ obtained as a continuous function of t
First: Let us show that there exists a unique continuously diﬀerentiable
function Φ such that ˆ λ = Φ(t). As it follows from Proposition 1, in every
non-trivial external equilibrium S, BI and INLP hold. By S and BI, there
exists ˆ λ ∈ (λ0,1) such that Y1(ˆ λ,t) − Y2(ˆ λ,t)=0 . We deﬁne the function
φ where φ(λ,t)=Y1(λ,t) − Y2(λ,t). Thus, in order to apply the implicit
function theorem we require that
∂φ(λ,t)
∂λ 6=0 . Solving this partial derivative
we have that
∂φ(λ,t)


















where I = w1 (1-t1) − w2 (1-t2) that by INLP I 6 0. By strict concavity of









dλ > 0. And since by Assumption 1
∂ ¯ w1(λ)
∂λ 6 0 we have
∂φ(λ,t)
∂λ < 0 for every t, that also guarantees that for each t, the skill ˆ λ is single
valued. Finally, since φ is continuously diﬀerentiable13 with respect to the
variables λ, t1 and t2 and
∂φ(λ,t)
∂λ 6=0 , by the implicit function theorem there
exists a unique continuously diﬀerentiable function Φ such that ˆ λ = Φ(t).
Second:L e tu ss h o wt h a t
∂Φ(t)






∂ˆ λ = −w1(¯ λ1—ˆ λ)/
∂φ(ˆ λ,t)
∂ˆ λ (11)
where w1(¯ λ1—ˆ λ) < 0 and by (10) we have that
∂φ(ˆ λ,t)
∂ˆ λ < 0, so that
∂Φ(t)
∂t1 < 0.
Third: Let us show that
∂Φ(t)






∂ˆ λ = −w2(ˆ λ − ¯ λ2)/
∂φ(ˆ λ,t)
∂ˆ λ (12)
where (ˆ λ − ¯ λ2) < 0 and
∂φ(ˆ λ,t)
∂ˆ λ < 0,s ot h a t
∂Φ(t)
∂t2 < 0.
13As we show in the second paragrahp of Section 4, the net income funtion is continously
diﬀerentiable in λ.
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